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Countering Foreign Influence 
Operations in US Elections
Explore Café, 8 April 
2020

• Oldest and most 
reliable means of  
influencing the 
outcome of  an 
adversary’s politics
• Exploits pre-
existing social 
divisions within a 
society (Race, 
Class, Ethnicity, 
Gender, Fear, etc)
• Aims to undermine 
confidence in 
political and social 
institutions
“The ability to maintain confidence and 
respond appropriately to information 
influence activities with fact-based, 
trustworthy messages is essential for a 
resilient, healthy democratic society.” 
Swedish  Civil Contingencies Agency
2016 Elections
• Aims: 
• Bolster likelihood of  Trump victory
• Sow discord and increase partisan polarization
• Tactics:
• Suppress African-American and Latino voting
• Divide liberal voters between Clinton, Stein (Greens) and 
Johnson (Libertarian)
• Increase solidarity and resolve of  conservative voters
• Delivery Systems: Facebook, Instagram, YouTube, “Useful 
idiots”, and ultimately mainstream media
• Techniques: 
• Weaponized intelligence (hacked emails)
• General disinformation (lies with a kernel of  truth 
embedded)
• “Virtual protest organizers”
Basic Rules of  
Active Measure
Create a believable lie
Hide identity of the 
originator
Disseminate the lie
Assess 
impact/effectiveness 
of the lie
Adjust and repeat
2020 Elections
Expect Russians to:
• Sow discord and exacerbate partisan 
polarization.
• Play the “race card,” e.g. stop and frisk 
policies, mass incarceration, police 
brutality.
• Exploit the “Bernie factor” if  Biden wins 
the election.
• Exploit corona virus response (rich vs poor)
• Exaggerate threat posed by foreigners 
(Asians, Latinos, Muslims)
• Incite protests between rival groups
• Create/forge stories showing corruption, 
incompetence or biases of  the candidate(s).
• Find a useful idiot (or co-optee) to relay 
their messages via social media, YouTube, 
etc.
Design an 
Information 
Operation to 
get a US 
candidate 
elected to 
office
Instructions: In small groups, design 
an information campaign directed at 
• favoring one candidate or another OR
• sowing discord/partisan polarization
Include these key elements
• Theme
• Based on theme, write a “believable lie.”
• Target Audience
• Delivery system (media channel)
Product for Larger Group
• One member of each group presents their 
campaign
• Provide a verbal summary
Our Goal: Counter Influence Operations
What should be our specific 
tasks?
❖ Protect democratic 
principles (Freedom of  
expression, democratic 
dialogue, free and open 
debate)
❖Maintain social and 
political stability in our 
communities (democratic, 
open, peaceful dialogue 
and social movements)
❖ Make yourself  and 
others aware of  the 
existence and methods of  
influence operations
❖ Be able to identify 
influence operations
Recognizing Information Warfare
• Media
• Majority of  the content is 
persuasive, not informative.
• Vague or unverifiable sources 
(“anonymous government 
source,” “a Bangladeshi 
newspaper.”)
• Misspellings or poor grammar 
in the content
• Bandwagoning via Bots
• Protests
• Organizer is not local and 
needs your assistance in 
arranging the protest
• Organizer is an unknown or 
unverifiable organization
Indicators of  a Bot
1. No or stolen profile picture
2. Extremely high number of  
responses
3. Bot names with random letters, 
numbers
4. Recently created site or time 
lapse between previous and most 
recent post.
5. Grammatical errors
6. Extreme rhetoric aimed at 
social/political divisions
7. Unverifiable user or profile
8. Frequent contact with other 
suspicious profiles
How to spot a BOT: 
https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/chat-
bot-canada-federal-election-
disinformation-1.5270765
